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Die-by framing both lengthens and shortens life: Further evidence on constructed beliefs in 
life expectancy 
 
Abstract: Decisions regarding consumption over the lifespan require some estimate of how long 
that lifespan is likely to be. Payne et al. (2013) found that respondents' estimates of their own life 
expectancy are on average 8.6 years shorter when elicited using a die-by frame than when 
elicited by a live-to frame. If decision makers act on these life expectancies, then an arbitrary 
detail of framing will lead to drastically different choices. We propose that the framing effect is 
sensitive to the iterative probabilistic elicitation procedure employed by the previous literature. 
Study 1 compares the framing effect across the iterative probabilistic procedure and a point 
estimate procedure that simply asks respondents the age they will live to/ die by. The iterative 
probabilistic procedure implies a life expectancy six years shorter in the die-by frame than in the 
live-to frame, replicating the results of Payne et al. (2013). With the point estimate procedure, 
however, the framing effect reverses: the die-by frame increases life expectancy by three years. 
In Study 2 we test for the framing effect using a point estimate procedure on a representative 
sample of 2000 Britons. Again, and in contrast with the previous literature, we find that the die-
by frame implies longer life. Our results reinforce the previous literature that beliefs around life 
expectancy are constructed. We recommend caution when attempting to debias life expectancy 
estimates or using life expectancies in choice architecture. 
Keywords: Life Expectancy; Framing Effects; Probabilistic Reasoning; Annuities  
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Judgments of life expectancy are implicit in many of life’s largest decisions (e.g. 
retirement saving and decumulation decisions; insurance purchase; house purchase; health 
behaviors etc.). The dominant models of life-cycle consumption assume that agents maximize 
the stream of utility over a lifespan that is known to the consumer ex ante (e.g. Benartzi & 
Thaler, 2007; Browning & Crossley, 2001, Modigliani, 1986).  
Recently, researchers have found that individuals’ estimates of their own life expectancy 
are far less stable than had been assumed in life-cycle models. Across three studies of over 2000 
people, elicitation using a die-by frame yielded an average implied life expectancy of 67, 
whereas a live-to frame yielded a life expectancy of 76 (Payne et a.l, 2013). The scale of this 
framing effect suggests dramatic implications for decisions regarding retirement savings and 
decumulation. Given that the US Social Security Administration calculates the Normal 
Retirement Age for people born after 1960 to be 67 (Office of the Chief Actuary, n.d.), the 
average respondent in Payne et al.’s live-to frame implied that their retirement savings would 
have to last over nine times as long as the average respondent in the die-by frame. If Payne et 
al.’s result pervades decision making, there are likely to be many households whose life plans are 
premised on biased information. One indication that Payne et al’s results generalize is that the 
framing effect has been replicated on samples of 2000 respondents in each of the Netherlands 
and Australia (Teppa, Thorpe & Bateman, 2015).  
Generalizability 
The current research points to a methodological feature of previous research on the live-
to/ die-by framing effect that has two important implications for its generalizability. Previous 
research elicits life expectancies using an iterative probabilistic procedure. Payne et al. (2013), 
Shu and Payne (2015) and Teppa et al. (2015) ask respondents to report the percentage chance 
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that they would live to [die by] 65 or older [younger]; then repeat the process for ages 75, 85 etc. 
We are concerned that this probabilistic method is 1) likely to exacerbate framing effects; 
and 2) unlikely to represent the method that people spontaneously adopt when making important 
life decisions. The remainder of this paper presents two studies that investigate our first concern 
experimentally: we test whether the probabilistic method exacerbates framing effects relative to a 
point estimate approach to estimating life expectancy. For the next paragraph we consider 
whether people are likely to spontaneously estimate life expectancy using probabilities.  
Hu and Odean (2011) point out that “anyone planning for retirement must answer an 
impossible question ‘How long will I live?'”. At issue is whether people answer that question by 
an iterative probabilistic procedure. That they do not is suggested by a wealth of research 
documenting that people are cognitive misers: they adopt strategies, termed heuristics, that 
reduce the effort required in judgment and decision making (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008; Simon, 1990). There are many 
papers documenting that people make complex judgments by spontaneously asking themselves 
easy-to-answer questions (for a review see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). For instance, when 
asked if they believe in climate change, lay people answer as if asked is today unusually hot? 
(Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2012). We have not encountered any evidence that people spontaneously 
ask themselves questions that require more steps and that are more difficult to calculate than 
other more intuitively phrased questions that get at the same underlying construct. Hu and Odean 
expressed the implicit question of life expectancy as how long will I live? Here in our study, we 
ask at what age will I live/ die? Each of these questions paraphrases the relevant question: what 
is my best estimate of my lifespan? to generate a point estimate in terms of years. The 
probabilistic question what is the percentage chance I will live to/ die by 65/ 75/ 85 etc.? does 
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not paraphrase the relevant question, nor does it even yield answers on the same scale; 
translating probabilities into chronological years requires a mathematical transformation of 
parameter estimates returned from a regression. The reader will recognize that the iterative 
probabilistic procedure is a less intuitive, more effort-intensive and more computation-intensive 
approach to estimating life expectancy than the point estimate procedures suggested by Hu and 
Odean (2011) and by us. We consider it unlikely that people spontaneously estimate their age of 
death with reference to probabilities because the alternative point estimate procedure is a more 
obvious approach, it gets at the estimate in fewer steps, and it requires less computation. Of 
course, this does not preclude the possibility that the probabilistic procedure is more 
representative of spontaneous judgment processes used for certain tasks. For instance, when it 
comes to a question regarding a specific age or event (e.g. “will I be alive to see my grandson 
graduate?”) people may spontaneously answer with some subjective likelihood estimate. 
However, for the task at issue – estimating life expectancies – we suggest that a point estimate 
procedure is the more likely candidate. 
Notwithstanding our concerns about how well the iterative probabilistic method captures 
spontaneous judgment processes, its use in previous studies is understandable because the 
influential Health and Retirement Study (henceforth HRS), a longitudinal survey, has collected 
data by the iterative probabilistic method since the early 1990s. This longitudinal data allows 
analysis of whether self-reported probability of living to age 75 predicts death. The answer is that 
it does, though probabilities do not sufficiently update to take account of health shocks (Smith, 
Taylor & Sloan, 2001) and men tend to be more optimistic than women (Hurd, 2009). More 
generally, concerns have been raised that HRS responses display inconsistencies relative to 
normative probability estimates (e.g. Hurd, 2009; Viscusi & Hakes, 2003). 
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Burdensome Probabilities 
Where the HRS elicits life expectancies by the probabilistic procedure, the Survey of 
Consumer Finances asks “about how long do you think you will live?”. Wu, Stevens and Thorp 
test the consistency of life expectancy implied by the point estimate procedure against the 
iterative probabilistic procedure, holding constant the live-to framing. They find “very low 
consistency” across these two measures that should yield identical estimates (Wu et al., 2015, 
p.26).  
The result that peoples’ probability estimates imply a different life expectancy than do 
their point estimates might be related to findings that suggest people find probabilities 
particularly difficult to work with. Inferences that are based on probabilities tend to be less 
normative than those based on natural frequencies (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2005). 
Laypeople tend to put less weight on statistical information when it is presented in a probabilistic 
format than when it is presented as a natural frequency (e.g. Fagerlin, Wang & Ubel, 2005). In 
summary, a high degree of numeracy is required to accurately interpret information expressed in 
probabilities (Reyna & Brainerd 2007).  
The difficulties with probabilities evidenced in the previous paragraph are likely to be 
exacerbated when people are asked to report information in terms of probabilities. When Kahan 
et al (2012) asked a representative sample of the US population to convert the natural frequency 
20 out of 100 to a percentage, 28 percent failed to do so accurately. Fischhoff and Bruine de 
Bruin document that some respondents report a 50% chance to indicate that they have “no idea” 
of the true probability (1999). A consequence is that survey questions that elicit responses in 
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terms of percentage probabilities tend to manifest an overrepresentation at 50%, which Fishhoff 
and Bruine de Bruin term a “50% blip”. The pervasiveness of 50 percent blips in the HRS’ life 
expectancy questions led the survey administrators to add a follow-up question so as to 
determine what respondents actually meant by answering “50%”. In 2006, fully 23 percent of 
those who responded to the life expectancy question reported their probability of living to 75 as 
50%. Just 37 percent of those went on to answer that they thought it equally likely that they 
would die before reaching the age of 75 as die after they turned 75 (Hurd, 2009). Unfortunately, 
there was no follow up question to determine whether responding “50%” overstated or 
understated each respondent’s optimism of living beyond age 75. We therefore cannot infer 
whether a bias was induced by the 50 blip. We can however infer that a substantial number of 
percentages in response to the iterative probabilistic procedure for eliciting life expectancy were 
misreported.  
Suggested Mechanisms 
We suggest three mechanisms through which probabilistic questions might exacerbate the 
live-to/ die-by framing effect. First, reporting biases in probability estimates could lead to an 
event-happens/ event-does-not-happen framing effect. Second, probabilistic questions seem 
especially susceptible to biased sampling of information. Third, the burden imposed by reporting 
probabilities could make respondents more prone to satisficing.  
Reporting a probability involves mapping a likelihood judgment onto a numerical scale. 
A bias in that mapping process would be expected to lead to a live-to/ die-by framing effect. 
Consider a respondent who reports probabilities that are 5 percentage points higher than her 
underlying likelihood judgment. Take the case where her likelihood judgment of being alive at 
age x is 15 percent. She would report a probability of being alive at age x as 20% (= 15% + 5% 
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bias). If reporting the complementary probability of being dead by age x, she would imply a 
probability of being alive at age x of just 10%. This occurs because her likelihood judgment of 
15% delivers a complementary 85% chance of being dead and the reporting bias will inflate this 
to a 90% probability, which implies a 10% probability of being alive. This reporting bias will 
lead to longer life expectancies by the live-to frame than the die-by frame. 
In reality reporting biases are likely to be less clean than in the stylized example above, 
but our point is that any bias in the mapping of subjective probabilities onto a numerical scale 
would deliver a live-to/ die-by framing effect, or more generally an event-happens/ event-does-
not-happen framing effect. For a more realistic example, we refer again to the HRS data to see 
how the use of round numbers could induce an event-happens/ event-does-not-happen framing 
effect.  
When asked the probability that an event occurs, a respondent should use whichever 
number between 0 and 100 best represents her likelihood judgment. If an event is perceived as 1 
percent more likely to occur than another event, we would like to see that it is reported as being 1 
percent more likely. In practice, respondents tend to report round numbers. The 2006 HRS 
question that asked the percentage likelihood of being alive at age 75 saw 43 percent of 
responses cluster at just three points, 0%, 50% and 100% (Hurd, 2009). It seems likely that at 
least some of the 15 percent of respondents who reported 100% chance of living to 75 
recognized that there is some risk of their dying before that age. This pattern of response 
suggests that some respondents are using round numbers to indicate qualitative judgments (e.g. 
“it is very likely”; “it is unlikely”), just as some respondents use 50% to mean “I have no idea”. 
In order that rounding does not lead to an event-happens/ event-does-not-happen framing effect it 
would have to be the case that the rounding errors observed by a positive frame are mirrored by 
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complementary rounding errors by a negative frame e.g. respondents should be just as likely to 
report 0% chance of being dead at 75 as 100% chance of being alive at 75.  
The second category of reasons why a probabilistic question could exacerbate framing 
effects relates to a mechanism Payne et al. hypothesise  – that the live-to frame calls to mind 
different information than the die-by frame. Questions that make salient one side of a binary 
outcome (e.g. “what is the chance you will live to age 85?”; “what is the chance it will remain 
dry tomorrow?”) evoke two categories of queries: those supporting realization of that specific 
outcome and those against realization of that specific outcome. Because these questions draw 
attention to one possible outcome at the expense of the other, they lead to biased retrieval of 
queries from one category at the expense of the other, as predicted by Query Theory (Johnson, 
Haubl & Keinen, 2007). Consequently, questions that focus on one side of a binary outcome 
cause that outcome to appear more likely, as evidenced in Mandel (2005), Yamagishi (2002) and 
most relevantly in Study 3 of Payne et al. (2013). The categories of queries evoked by the open-
ended question “what age will you live to?” are less predictable and are likely to vary from one 
respondent to another. They might include for example “what age does someone of my sex and 
class typically die at?”; “do I have a family history of long life?”; “how healthy am I relative to 
the average person?” Given the range of possible queries that could be evoked by the point 
estimate procedure, Query Theory does not offer a definitive prediction on how point estimates 
will respond to the live-to/ die-by frame. For this reason, we expect the live-to/ die-by frame to 
induce more bias into the information retrieval process by the probabilistic procedure than it 
induces into the point estimate procedure.  
Finally, we predict that respondents who have answered by the probabilistic procedure 
will have fewer cognitive resources with which to correct for biased information retrieval than 
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those who answered by the point estimate procedure. Given the prior literature documenting 
respondents’ difficulties reporting percentages it seems likely that cognitive resources are 
especially sapped by the task of estimating percentages. Additionally, the iterative probabilistic 
procedure entails answering four probabilistic questions. The effort this entails might leave fewer 
cognitive resources available for generating new queries, weighting queries appropriately and 
recognizing whether existing queries are representative (i.e. not biased). We would therefore 
expect to see an exacerbation of framing effects when respondents are asked to report 
percentages relative to when a less burdensome procedure is used. 
In summary, we have outlined three reasons why the probabilistic procedure seems more 
susceptible to live-to/ die-by framing effects relative to a point estimate procedure. First, biased  
use of percentages could lead to an event-happens/ event-does-not-happen framing effect. 
Second, their question wordings seem to invite biased sampling of information. Third, the burden 
they impose could provoke satisficing. We therefore believe that there is sufficient theoretical 
basis to pursue the question of whether a point estimate procedure yields similar framing effects 
to the iterative probabilistic procedure studied in previous research.  
3. Study 1 
Our study follows a 2 (live to/ die by frame) *2 (probabilistic/ point estimation) design. 
Our dependent variable is estimated age of death (henceforth fail age), as inferred from 
responses. In this study we test for the first of our proposed mechanisms – that there is a 
systematic interaction between the live-to/ die-by frame and errors in reports of percentages.  
 
3.1. Participants  
A convenience sample of UK residents aged over 18 (N=563) were anonymously 
Page 9 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Peer Review Only
10 
 
recruited online via Facebook, workplace email and the University of Stirling Portal. Eleven 
were removed for non-consent and 45 for non-UK residence. Thirty respondents dropped out 
before encountering the questions that elicited the dependent variable, and a further thirty who 
started answering the dependent variable failed to complete the remainder of the survey. This 
leaves 447 complete responses. As shall be explained more fully in the results section, a further 
thirty respondents had to be excluded from the analyses because their probability estimates did 
not admit estimation of fail age. This leaves a final sample size of 417 (60% female; aged 18-87, 
Mage = 38) 444.  
 
3.2. Materials  
Participants completed an online survey hosted by SurveyGizmo, which elicited in order 
of appearance: age, sex, occupational status, then the life expectancy measure. There then 
followed other questions including 3 items from the PANAS scale, which are discussed in 
section 5. A full list of verbatim questions is presented in the Appendix. Lastly we asked whether 
the respondent had solicited help with the survey.   
Respondents were randomly assigned to indicate life expectancy by one of the four 
procedures set out in table 1: 
[Table 1] 
Participants allocated to the probabilistic questions answered on horizontal slider-scales. 
We counterbalanced whether these ran from 0 to 100 or from 100-0 in order to control for scale 
presentation effects, replicating Payne et al’s design (2013). One difference between our design 
and Payne et al’s is that all of our respondents reported probabilities in the same order (i.e. age 
65, then 75, 85, & finally 95), whereas Payne et al varied the age for which respondents were 
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first asked to report probability.  
 
3.3. Methods 
For respondents assigned to the point estimate procedure, the answer to the live to or die 
by question was taken as our dependent variable, fail age. For those assigned to the iterative 
probabilistic procedure, fail age was computed using the methodology reported in Payne et al 
(2013).  We created a personal regression equation for each respondent from their reported 
probabilities of living to each of the ages in probabilistic questions (65, 75, 85 and 95) and, 
consistent with Payne et al, additional observations were added at the respondent’s current age, 
for which a probability of 100 percent was imputed, and age 130, for which probability of 0 
percent was imputed. The parameter estimates from that regression were used to estimate a 
Weibull distribution curve, from which we could estimate the age at which the probability of 
dying is 50 percent, which was taken to be the fail age. A full explanation of the method used can 
be found in Appendix A of Payne et al 2013. 
Our hypothesis is that fail age is predicted by a significant interaction between the 
iterative probabilistic procedure and the live-to/ die-by frame. 
 
 
3.4 Results 
Completion rates were similar across survey conditions. A logistic regression of drop out 
from the survey shows that neither the probabilistic iterative procedure nor the die-by frame has 
a significant effect (both ps > .20). Survey condition was not related to age or gender of 
respondents (all ps > .20).  
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The iterative probabilistic procedure elicited a large number of misreported percentages. 
Twenty-eight of the 220 respondents (12%) using the probabilistic procedure reported higher 
probabilities of being alive at older ages than the probabilities they reported of being alive at 
younger ages. We were forced to drop these incoherent responses from the analysis because 
Weibull estimates could not be calculated for them. Consistent with Payne et al’s methods, we 
retained the six respondents who implied equal probabilities of living to 65, 75, 85 and 95 - in 
one case 100 percent probability, in three cases 50 percent probability, and 65 percent and 80 
percent in the remaining cases.  
 In addition to the 28 respondents who gave incoherent probabilities, we were also forced 
to exclude from analyses two respondents for whom the Weibull distribution could not be 
calculated on account of their being aged over 65. The first stage of the Weibull estimation 
procedure requires taking the log of the difference between 65 and current age. Because this 
difference is negative for respondents older than 65, its log does not exist. In total, 30 
respondents had to be dropped because Weibull distributions could not be calculated for them. 
Figure 1 sets out the core result of study 1. As can be observed, the live-to/ die-by 
framing effect was not merely attenuated by the point estimate procedure, but actually reversed. 
Figure 1 also graphs results from a follow-up Study 2, which replicated the reversal.  
 
 
[Figure 1: Life Expectancies by Survey Condition] 
 
 
 
Focussing first on the iterative probabilistic procedure, we replicated Payne et al’s result: 
the die-by frame reduces life expectancy by 7 years relative to the live-to frame. Normal 
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skewness and kurtosis was rejected for fail age and so in what follows we report the results of 
OLS regressions on a Box-Cox normalized dependent variable. Controlling for age, gender, 
occupation status and direction of probability scale (i.e. whether the response scale went from 
100 – 0 left-to-right), fail age by the die-by frame is significantly younger than by the live-to 
frame [t = 4.53, p < .001, η
2 
= .10]. Direction of probability scale does not have an effect on 
estimated fail age [t = 0.73, p = .468], consistent with Payne et al’s results.  
By the point estimate procedure, the effect of the die-by frame reverses relative to the 
results reported above and in Payne et al (2013). The die-by frame now raises life expectancy by 
3 years relative to the live-to frame. Controlling for age, gender and occupation status, fail age 
by the die-by frame is significantly older than by the live-to frame [t = 2.10, p = .037, η
2 
= .02]. 
Comparing fail ages across the live-to and die-by frames, it is clear that the hypothesized 
interaction between the probabilistic method and the live-to/ die-by frame is present. A 
regression in which we control for main effects of procedure and frame, age, gender, and 
occupation status confirms that the interaction of procedure and frame is statistically significant 
[t = 5.98, p < .001, η
2 
= .04].  
We now analyse whether the data support the mechanisms we proposed for why the 
probabilistic procedure would be especially prone to the live-to/ die-by framing effect. We 
suggested that working with percentages exerts a cognitive toll on respondents, which may 
inhibit correction for biased information retrieval. If there is in fact a greater cognitive burden on 
respondents in the probabilistic conditions, then we might expect that this burden would lead to 
fatigue and a higher rate of drop-out from the survey. Respondents in the probabilistic condition 
were in fact no more likely to drop out of the survey than those in the point estimate condition [Z 
= 1.20, p = .23). We would also expect that, if the probabilistic questions were particularly 
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burdensome, they might make respondents more likely to seek help. More respondents (7.4%) in 
the probabilistic condition reported having sought help than in the point estimate condition 
(4.1%), though this difference is not statistically significant [Z = 1.38, p > .1]. We cannot 
conclude, at least from these crude measures, that the probabilistic method was more cognitively 
taxing than the point estimate method. 
We now test the second mechanism we proposed, that respondents’ errors in reporting 
percentages are predicted by the framing manipulation. The first point to note on this is that there 
was a significant effect of the die-by frame on the coherence of reported probabilities. 24 of the 
28 respondents who reported percentages that implied a higher probability of being alive at an 
older age than at a younger age answered by the die-by frame [odds ratio = 4.53, Z(181) = 2.32, 
p = .020].  
Additionally, there is evidence to support rounding as a source of the event-happens/ 
event-does-not-happen framing effects. Of the 228 respondents aged under 65 who reported a 
probability of living to age 65, 21 indicated absolute certainty. Crucially, 18 of these absolute 
responses came from respondents in the live-to condition reporting 100% compared with just 
three from respondents in the die-by condition reporting 0%. A logistic regression controlling for 
age, gender, occupation status and direction of probability scale shows this difference to be 
significant [odds ratio = 8.50, Z = 3.21, p = .001]. Generally, respondents answering by the live-
to frame were more likely to use round numbers (0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 80%, 
90%, 95% or 100%) than were those answering by the die-by frame [odds ratio = 2.21, Z = 2.62, 
p = .009]. These results suggest that reporting of probabilities interacts with the live-to/ die-by 
framing effect to generate systematic errors. 
A similar test on reported point estimates of fail age shows no difference in the use of 
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round numbers (70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100) across the live-to and die-by frames [Z = 0.56, p = 
.573]. We return to consider what might drive the point estimate procedure to show higher life 
expectancies by the live-to frame than by the die-by frame in section 5.  
Discussion  
Using the probabilistic procedure employed in previous studies, we replicate the framing 
effect found in those studies. The contribution of the current study is that it demonstrates that the 
live-to/ die-by framing effect is moderated by elicitation procedure. 
We suggested three mechanisms through which probability estimates might exacerbate 
the live-to/ die-by framing effect, two of which were explored in our data analysis. First, we 
hypothesized that reporting probabilities would impose a burden on respondents. Our measures 
showed no evidence that respondents in the probabilistic condition were more burdened than 
those in the point-estimate condition. Second, we suggested that biased reporting of percentages 
could cause differences in estimated fail age across frames.  We found respondents were more 
likely to report incoherent percentages by the die-by frame and were more likely to report 
rounded percentages (e.g. 80% rather than 82%) by the live-to frame. In short, reporting errors 
do differ systematically across the live-to and die-by frames.  
 We did not explicitly test the third mechanism we proposed, which was that the question 
wording of the probabilistic procedure invites biased retrieval of information. That mechanism 
was tested, and support found for it, in Study 3 of Payne et al. (2013). For evidence that the point 
estimate procedure moderates this mechanism we point to the main results of the current study. 
Where the probabilistic procedure causes the live-to frame to evoke more queries in support of 
longer life than the die-by frame, figure 1 suggests that, if anything, the point estimate procedure 
causes the die-by frame to evoke more queries in support of longer life than the live-to frame. 
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Though the scale of the framing effect by the point-estimate procedure was relatively small (3 
years), it did attain statistical significance and so warrants a test for robustness. We report this in 
the next section.  
Study 2 
In study 2 we test for the live-to/ die-by effect using the point estimate procedure on a 
representative sample of UK residents.  
Participants 
A nationally representative sample of UK residents aged over 18 (N=2096) undertook 
this four minute online survey as the first section in a multi-survey questionnaire, on 14-16 June 
2016
1
.  The sample was selected from Populus’s proprietary panel of 130,000 UK adults.  Quotas 
were set on age, gender and region based on the known profile of Great Britain based on the 
2012 National Readership Survey, a random probability face-to-face survey conducted annually 
with 34,000 adults. The characteristics of respondents in the live-to condition (Mage = 48, 49% 
female) did not differ significantly from those in the die-by condition (Mage = 49, 50% female, 
both ps > .25).   
Methods 
As the first question in the survey, respondents were randomly allocated to one of four 
questions, of which two were the live-to/ die-by point estimate questions. The question wordings 
for these are precisely as they were in the previous study. The remaining conditions do not 
contribute to our research question
2
 and so for the current analysis we drop the respondents 
assigned to these conditions.  
                                                 
1
 This was shortly prior to the EU “Brexit” Referendum on 30
th
 June.  Whilst there may have been some uncertainty 
resulting from the proximity to the ballot, we can think of no reason for this to have disproportionately affected any 
one branch of the treatment. 
2
 They asked how long the respondent’s pension would have to last and how many years of education the respondent 
had. 
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Results 
The pattern of results replicates that of Study 1. The die-by fail age is again older (Mdie-by 
= 83.5) than the live-to fail age (Mlive-to = 81.7). Normal skewness and kurtosis was rejected for 
fail age and so we ran a bivariate OLS regression on a Box-Cox normalized dependent variable, 
which finds this difference to be statistically significant:  t = 2.67, p = .008. The survey provider 
furnished us with a large range of demographic measures: age, gender, education level, 
employment status, marital status, income category, disability status, religion and region. 
Controlling for these in a regression of the Box-Cox corrected variable, the die-by frame remains 
significant [t = 2.57, p = .010, η
2
 = .006].  
Some Results Regarding the Reversal 
We began this research with the hypothesis that requiring respondents to report 
probabilities would make them particularly susceptible to live-to/ die-by framing effects. We did 
not anticipate a reversal of the effect using the point estimate procedure. In study 2, we 
prioritized testing the robustness of this reversal rather than its underlying mechanism with the 
result that we collected less information than we would have liked but from a larger and more 
representative sample. The reader might have correctly inferred from the header to this 
subsection that we cannot explain the specific mechanism by which the die-by frame elicits 
higher point estimates of fail age than the live-to frame. In this section we report some results 
that suggest a heuristic is at play and that might prove useful for future research on this question.  
Table 2 summarizes fail ages from Studies 1 and 2 at various points in the distribution. 
We had hoped to see some pattern common to both datasets, but whereas in Study 1 the effect of 
the die-by frame increases towards the top of the distribution, in Study 2 it remains fairly 
constant throughout.  
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[Table 2] 
We conducted exploratory tests using variables common to both datasets – age, gender 
and occupation status. None were found to moderate the effect.  In study 1, we collected some 
affect items at the close of the survey: items on distress, afraid and enthusiasm from the PANAS 
scale (Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988). These affect measures do show significant moderation. 
Before reporting those moderation results, it is instructive to see how these affect items relate to 
our core variables. Consistent with the idea that dying is aversive, respondents who estimated 
lower fail ages also rated themselves higher on the distress and afraid scales and lower on the 
enthusiasm scale [OLS: distress: t = 3.33, p = .002; afraid: t = 3.40, p = .001; enthusiastic: t = 
3.12, p = .002]. The live-to/ die-by manipulation did not cause a change in any of these affect 
measures (all ps > .20).  
 Separate OLS regressions show that, after controlling for main effects, those who 
reported lower levels of distress and afraid demonstrated the largest response to the die-by-frame 
[distress interaction: t = 1.93, p = .055; afraid interaction: t = 2.00, p = .047] and those who 
reported higher levels of enthusiasm demonstrated larger effects in response to the die-by frame 
[t = 3.38, p = .001]. The enthusiasm interaction emerges as significant from a model including all 
three affect measures and their interactions [t = 2.89, p = .004].  
These results are consistent with research showing that positive affect results in less 
analytic processing, and hence greater reliance on heuristics, relative to negative affect (e.g. 
Ruder and Bless, 2003; Sinclair and Mark, 1995). One heuristic that has been helpfully 
suggested by an anonymous reviewer is based on Yaniv and Schul’s observation that a stricter 
decision criterion is applied when judging what to include than when judging what to exclude 
(1997, 2000). Yaniv and Schul’s model and experiments predict that there is a range of ages that 
Page 18 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Peer Review Only
19 
 
would not meet the criterion to be included as plausible ages at which to still be alive but they 
will also not meet the criterion to be excluded as plausible ages at which to still be alive. In other 
words, these ages are included by the exclusionary approach, but not included by the 
inclusionary approach. If the die-by frame evokes an exclusionary approach and the live-to frame 
evokes an inclusionary approach then there is some range of ages at the top of the distribution 
that informs estimation of the age the respondent will die by, but does not inform estimation of 
the age the respondent will live to. What approach respondents actually take to answering the 
live-to/ die-by questions, and more generally to spontaneously estimating age of death, will have 
to wait for future research. 
 
General Discussion 
Our results provide further evidence of constructed beliefs in life expectancy. 
Specifically, they demonstrate that life expectancy estimates are sensitive not merely to whether 
they are elicited in a live-to or die-by frame, but are also sensitive to whether they are elicited 
probabilistically or as point estimates.  
Whereas errors in reports of percentages and Query Theory offer an explanation for the 
direction of the framing effect in probabilistic questions, we can only speculate on why the live-
to/ die-by framing effect reverses when elicited by point estimates.  
We conclude by considering some real world implications of our results. Payne et al. 
(2013) express concern that the “10 year difference in the median expected age of being dead or 
alive is … highly meaningful to a number of important life decisions, such as how to finance 
one's consumption during retirement”. Our results offer some reassurance as well as some 
additional concern on this point. Further to Payne et al.’s concerns that estimates of life 
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expectancy are not stable, we add that the framing effect itself is not stable. A striking result is 
apparent from focussing on participants in the die-by conditions of our Study 1: answering the 
probabilistic-iterative procedure relative to the point-estimate procedure reduces life expectancy 
by nine years (see figure 1).  
Our first implication concerns analyses of secondary data on life expectancy. The 
discrepancy across the probabilistic-iterative procedure and the point estimate procedure has 
implications for the validity of research that uses subjective life expectancy as a variable. The 
Health and Retirement Survey uses the probabilistic-iterative procedure and the Survey of 
Consumer Finances uses the point estimate procedure. A search on Google Scholar
3
 for the exact 
phrases “Health and Retirement Survey” and “life expectancy” returned 1910 results. A search 
for “Survey of Consumer Finances” and “life expectancy” returned 1780. Our results suggest 
that these analyses will have been sensitive to the procedure that was used to elicit life 
expectancy, and that the distortions induced by these procedures may have been large. 
Our second implication is for measurement of subjective estimates of life expectancy. 
One advantage of the iterative probabilistic procedure is that it delivers a probability distribution 
of fail ages for each respondent. Its disadvantages are substantial however. First, the resultant 
probability distributions are of questionable validity since they are biased by information 
retrieval and in many cases they are derived from misreported percentages. Second, the 
procedure is costly in terms of missing data: in Study 1 we lost estimated fail ages for 14 percent 
of the probabilistic conditions’ sample because Weibull distributions could not be calculated for 
30 out of 220 observations. We recommend development of a new means to elicit distributions of 
life expectancies. On the basis of the current results, we would recommend that this procedure 
does not ask respondents to report percentages.  
                                                 
3
 Conducted on October 19
th
 2016 
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A third implication is a note of caution on applying the live-to/ die-by frame as a piece of 
choice architecture to nudge decision making. In some circumstances die-by frames increase life 
expectancy and in others they decrease life expectancy. This reversal should give policymakers 
pause before attempting to apply these framing effects as nudges.   
We finish with a question for future research. We found that the framing effect 
manifested by point estimate procedures is smaller in scale than that returned by the iterative 
probabilistic procedure. If our logic is correct that people are unlikely to spontaneously employ 
the iterative probabilistic procedure to estimate life expectancy when making decisions, then the 
difference in expected age of being dead or alive is likely to be substantially less than that 
suggested by the previous literature, and to that extent, less of a source of bias in decision 
making. However, it is possible that people spontaneously employ a live-to frame in some 
circumstances (e.g. when deciding whether to buy a vacation home) and a die-by frame in others 
(e.g. when deciding to annuitize or take a lump-sum payment). An important question for future 
research is to determine how spontaneous judgments of life expectancy are formed.    
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Table 1  
Life expectancy elicitation procedures and question wording 
Procedure Wording 
Probabilistic 
live-to 
“The chance that I will live to be 65/ 75/ 85/ 95 years old or older is 
________” 
Probabilistic 
die-by 
“The chance that I will die at 65/ 75/ 85/ 95 years old or younger is 
_________”  
Point live-to “I expect to live to age ____” 
Point die-by “I expect to die by age ____” 
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Table 2  
Point estimates of life expectancy at various points in the distribution 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Live-to Die-by Live-to Die-by 
25
th
 percentile 78.5 78 75 79 
50
th
 percentile 84 84.5 80 85 
75
th
 percentile 88 90 88 90 
90
th
 percentile 90 97 95 98 
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Figure 1: Life Expectancies by Survey Condition 
 
Fig. 1: Mean Estimated Fail Ages (life expectancies) from the Probabilistic Iterative Procedure 
(far left) and Point Estimate procedures (center and right). Differences in sample sizes across 
conditions in Study 1 are accounted for by 30 respondents in the probabilistic conditions for 
whom it was impossible to estimate fail ages.  
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